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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s Congress began responding to public demands for
more effective law enforcement.1  Congress was of the view that
“crime and civil disobedience” were “surging” in the nation, while at
the same time, convictions were dwindling due to the increase in de-
fendants’ rights.2  Many members of Congress believed that recent Su-
preme Court decisions in cases like Miranda v. Arizona,3 Mallory v.
United States,4 and McNabb v. United States5 were causing prosecu-
tors to lose convictions because otherwise voluntary confessions were
being suppressed.6  Thus, Congress passed Title II of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in an attempt to define “new stan-
dards for admissibility of confessions.”7  This was an attempt by Con-
gress to abrogate the unnecessary delay rule in the McNabb-Mallory
line of cases.8
Prior to the McNabb-Mallory line of cases, a confession would be
admissible at trial if it was voluntarily obtained.9  However, after the
decision in McNabb, which was reaffirmed in Mallory, an otherwise
voluntary confession would be excluded if it was the product of unrea-
sonable delay in presenting a defendant before a committing magis-
trate or judge.10  Since Congress believed that this judicially-created
rule was causing too many defendants to be acquitted, Congress in-
cluded provisions in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
to restore the pre-McNabb-Mallory voluntariness test used in deter-
mining whether a confession would be admitted.11  These provisions
were codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501.  However, subsection 3501(c) has
caused the federal courts difficulty when interpreting this statute.
The main question is: Does subsection (c) work to completely abrogate
the McNabb-Mallory rule, or does subsection (c) merely limit McNabb
and Mallory by creating a “safe harbor” where presentation delay can-
not be a reason for excluding a confession, provided it is obtained
within six-hours of arrest?  Under the former view, voluntariness is
restored as the sole test for admission of a confession, even if obtained
1. Kenneth C. Stephan, Comment, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Bill:  A Study of
the Interaction of Law and Politics, 48 NEB. L. REV. 193, 193 (1968).
2. Note, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control Act: A Study in Constitutional Con-
flict, 57 GEO. L.J. 438, 438 (1968).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
5.  318 U.S. 332 (1943).
6. Note, supra note 2, at 438.
7. Stephan, supra note 1, at 193.
8. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 37–41 (1968).
9. Samuel M. Davis, Comment, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Street Act of 1968 as it Affects the Admissibility of Confessions and Eyewitness
Testimony, 40 MISS. L.J. 257, 258 (1968).
10. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957).
11. Stephan, supra note 1, at 193.
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more than six hours after arrest.12  Under the latter view, if a confes-
sion is obtained more than six hours after an arrest but before presen-
tation before a magistrate, the confession must be excluded due to
unreasonable delay.13  This debate went on for over forty years until
the latter view was adopted by the Supreme Court in Corley v. United
States.14
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Corley, com-
paring the reasoning for the decision with the reasoning for the oppo-
site conclusion, adopted by the dissent and many circuits.  Part II
provides the background of the McNabb-Mallory decision, Congress’
response and intent in 18 U.S.C. § 3501, and how section 3501 has
been interpreted by the lower federal courts.  Part III argues for the
adoption of the dissent’s view by examining various reasons compel-
ling its conclusion.  These include the legislative intent of section
3501, the negative implications created by the holding in Corley, and
policy reasons that favor the dissent’s view.  Part IV concludes by ad-
vocating that Congress intended to completely abrogate the McNabb-
Mallory rule, thereby restoring a complete voluntariness test to re-
store judicial discretion and eliminate acquittals based on
technicalities.
II. BACKGROUND
After several Supreme Court decisions, including McNabb and
Mallory, the Court was criticized for “allegedly ‘hamstring[ing]’ police
and ‘moddycoddl[ing]’ criminal offenders.”15  Both the President and
Congress seemed to side with this popular view.16  Understandably,
tensions arose between Congress and the Court, leading to the adop-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 3501.  This section seeks to further explain how the
McNabb-Mallory rule came to be, why it was disfavored by Congress,
and how Congress responded.  This section also explains the intent
behind the statute and how it has been interpreted by the lower
courts.
12. See United States v. Clarke, 110 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a volun-
tary confession obtained more than twelve hours after the defendant’s arrest and
before her arraignment was admissible into evidence under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c)).
13. See United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that a voluntary
confession obtained more than six hours after arrest and before presentation is
inadmissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c)); United States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that a voluntary confession obtained more than six
hours after arrest and before presentation is inadmissible under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501(c)).
14. 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009).
15. Stephan, supra note 1, at 193.
16. Id.
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A. The Pre-McNabb-Mallory Voluntariness Test
Before the Supreme Court began developing rules for confessions
in cases like McNabb, Mallory, and Miranda, the Court used a volun-
tariness test to determine if a confession violated the Fifth Amend-
ment due to coercion.17  Under the voluntariness test, the trial court
would look at the “totality of the circumstances” to determine if the
confession was the product of coercion—thereby violating the Fifth
Amendment—or if it was given by the defendant’s own free will.18  If
the confession was not voluntary, it would be excluded.  The voluntari-
ness test and exclusionary rule can be traced back to English common
law in 1783, and both naturally became part of the United States com-
mon law.19  Initially, the Supreme Court was concerned with “third
degree tactics”20 and condemned state or federal convictions that were
the product of “third degree” coercion.21  Thus, the traditional volun-
tariness standard was the only “absolute prerequisite to the admissi-
bility of a confession obtained by the police.”22  This rule was virtually
extinguished under McNabb v. United States.23
B. The McNabb-Mallory Rule
In McNabb v. United States,24 the Supreme Court declared that a
confession obtained by federal officers during a pre-arraignment delay
in violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
would be excluded at trial, regardless of whether the confession was
voluntary.25  Rule 5(a) required that an arrested individual be
brought before the nearest available committing magistrate without
17. Davis, supra note 9, at 258.
18. Id.
19. OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 19
(1973).  The first formal rule of exclusion was stated in 1783:
A free and voluntary confession is deserving  of the highest credit,
because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and
therefore is admitted as proof of the crime the which it refers; but a con-
fession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of
fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the
evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is
reject.
Id. at 19–20 (citing The King v. Warickshall, (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B.)).
20. Third degree tactics have been defined as “employment of methods which inflict
suffering, physical or mental, upon a person in order to obtain information about
a crime.” STEPHENS, supra note 19, at 10 (citing NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSER-
VANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 2
(1931)).
21. Id. at 10.
22. Id. at 21–22.
23. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
24. Id.
25. Jerald P. Keene, Ill-Advised State Court Revival of the McNabb-Mallory Rule, 72
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 204, 206 (1981).
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unnecessary delay.26  Thus, McNabb applied the exclusionary rule to
Rule 5(a).  Under this new rule, if an arrested person was not brought
before a committing magistrate within a reasonable amount of time,
then any confession—even a voluntary confession—obtained by the
federal officer prior to arraignment would be automatically excluded.
This rule was reaffirmed in Mallory v. United States.27
The McNabb-Mallory cases show a shift from the Court only being
concerned with “third-degree” coercion to the Court considering new
dimensions of human dignity and individual rights.28  Thus, the
Court’s holdings in McNabb and Mallory served the purpose of deter-
ring “evil potentialities” of law enforcement, which condoned secret
police interrogations, and “insur[ing] the purity of criminal proceed-
ings by effectively prohibiting investigative arrests.”29  Put another
way, “the reason for the McNabb-Mallory doctrine was simple—to dis-
courage the police practice of rounding up suspects or ‘prospects,’ and
eliciting confessions from them to support probable cause for the ar-
rest, in the absence of any other probable cause that would be accept-
able to a magistrate.”30  The police now had a new system to contend
with because voluntariness was no longer the standard.
The McNabb-Mallory rule essentially abrogated the voluntariness
test and replaced it with a delay test.31  It is interesting, however, that
neither McNabb nor Mallory were decided on constitutional grounds
(e.g., under the Due Process or Self-Incrimination Clauses).32  Instead,
the McNabb-Mallory rule was an application of several statutes en-
acted by the legislature.33  The Court interpreted these statutes to re-
26. Id. at 207; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
27. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).  The McNabb-Mallory rule is often referred to as the Unnec-
essary Delay Rule.
28. STEPHENS, supra note 19, at 30.
29. Note, supra note 2, at 450.
30. Davis, supra note 9, at 278–79.  Third degree practices were often difficult to
prove as it became the word or the police versus the word of the suspects.  The
Court was aware of this, which provided all the more reason to adopt the Mc-
Nabb-Mallory rule. YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS:
ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 9 (1980).
31. James E. Hogan & Joseph M. Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule:  Its Rise, Ratio-
nale and Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J. 1, 5–6 (1958).
32. See Jeffery C. Munnell, In-Custodial Interrogation and the McNabb-Mallory
Rule—A Proposal, 72 DICK. L. REV. 325, 329 (1968); Keith E. Kaiser, Note, Crimi-
nal Law—Confessions—Delay in Arraignment—Confessions Given More than Six
Hours After Arrest During a Delay in Arraignment are Admissible Under 18
U.S.C. § 3501(c), Although the Trial Judge Under Subsection 3501(b) May Take
into Account Delay in Arraignment in His Determination of Voluntariness: United
States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970), 3 ST. MARY’S L.J. 103, 106 (1971)
(“[T]he authorities generally regard the rule as one not invoking the constitu-
tional provisions of due process but rather it is an evidentiary rule applicable to
federal courts only.”).
33. STEPHENS, supra note 19, at 65.
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quire prompt presentation of arrestees before a magistrate and
exclusion of their confessions if they were the result of unreasonable
delay.34  The holding, therefore, did not rest on whether the confes-
sions in McNabb or Mallory were voluntary, but on whether there was
“reasonable promptness” in presenting the arrested suspect before a
committing magistrate.35  By choosing this course of action, the Court
rendered any voluntariness analysis superfluous unless it could be
shown that there was prompt presentation.36
C. Legislative Action Against the McNabb-Mallory Rule
The Court’s holdings in both McNabb and Mallory were not well
received by the lower federal courts.37  Many of the states were also
hostile to the McNabb-Mallory rule.38  Moreover, Congress was not
pleased with the decision in McNabb and Mallory and eventually crip-
pled the rule.39  The first attempt to eliminate the McNabb decision
was in 1947 when Congressman Samuel F. Hobbs introduced the
Hobbs Bill.40  The pertinent portion of the bill stated: “[N]o failure to
observe the requirement of law as to the time within which a person
under arrest must be brought before a magistrate . . . shall render
inadmissible any evidence that is otherwise admissible.”41  Congress-
man Hobbs, a former trial judge, stated his preference for a voluntari-
ness test to admit a confession.42  Like many of the lower courts and
states, Hobbs was concerned that an obviously guilty suspect would be
freed merely because a federal officer failed to promptly present the
prisoner to a magistrate.43  It is clear that the McNabb-Mallory deci-
sions were overreaching the intended goal of deterring coercive police
conduct and causing confessions obtained in good faith to be held inad-
missible due to presentation delays.44
34. Id.; see infra note 200.
35. STEPHENS, supra note 19, at 66.
36. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).  However, no guidance was
given by the court as to what constituted prompt presentment.
37. KAMISAR, supra note 30, at 212; Hogan & Snee, supra note 31, at 5–6 (explaining
that when the Supreme Court announced the decision in McNabb many lower
courts were outraged, unsympathetic, and even hostile because they thought Mc-
Nabb was “bad law”).
38. KAMISAR, supra note 30, at 212 (explaining that since McNabb-Mallory was not a
constitutional decision, it had no effect on state practices, but many states still
refuse to adopt such a rule).
39. Id.
40. H.R. 3690, 78th Cong. (1943).
41. Admission of Evidence in Certain Cases: Hearings Before the Subcomm. No. 2 of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong. 1 (1943).
42. STEPHENS, supra note 19, at 70.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Alston v. United States, 348 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (presenting a situa-
tion where a suspect voluntarily confessed within five minutes of his arrest, but
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The Hobbs Bill was never enacted by Congress, but that did not
prevent subsequent legislatures from proposing legislation designed
to overrule the McNabb-Mallory line of cases.  In 1968, the McNabb-
Mallory rule was finally overruled with the passage of Title II of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.45  Title II was
designed to restore and codify the traditional due process voluntari-
ness test to suppress a confession, nullifying McNabb and Mallory and
restoring the “totality of the circumstance test.”46
The portion of  Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act that was drafted to nullify the McNabb-Mallory rule and
restore the voluntariness test was 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a), (b), and (c).47
Subsection (a) plainly states that a confession “shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given.”48  Subsection (b) provides five fac-
tors that a trial judge may take into consideration to determine the
voluntariness of a confession.  Specifically, subsection (b)(1) instructs
the trial judge to consider the amount of time between arrest and
presentation before a magistrate to determine if a confession is volun-
tary.  Thus, when these two sections are read together, it appears that
the court held his statement was inadmissible because he was not promptly
presented before a magistrate).
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006).
46. Keene, supra note 25, at 209; Davis, supra note 9, at 258.  However, in Corley v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009), the Court refused to hold that Congress
meant to eliminate McNabb and Mallory.  Instead, the Court held that Congress
only meant to narrow the McNabb-Mallory rule in 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
47. The pertinent portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 are as follows:
(a) In any prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of
Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be ad-
missible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.  Before such confession is
received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury,
determine any issue as to voluntariness.  If the trial judge determines
that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in
evidence. . . .
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take
into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the
confession including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraign-
ment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest
and before arraignment . . . .
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or of the District of
Columbia, a confession made by a person who is the defendant therein,
while such person was under arrest . . . shall not be inadmissible solely
because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate judge . . . if
such confession is found by the trial judge to have been voluntarily . . .
and if such confession was made . . . within six hours immediately follow-
ing his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the time limitation con-
tained in this subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay
in bringing such person before such magistrate judge or other officer be-
yond such six hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable
considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled
to the nearest available . . . magistrate judge.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2006).
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Congress restored the voluntary “totality of the circumstances test”
and abrogated the McNabb-Mallory rule.49  However, Congress also
included subsection (c), which has been the source of difficulty in in-
terpreting the statute.
The only clear rule in subsection (c) is that a trial court cannot
suppress a voluntary confession because of an unreasonable delay if
the confession was given within six hours.50  The difficulty has been
what to do with a voluntary confession obtained more than six hours
after the arrest but before presentation.  This was the issue in Corley
v. United States,51 and, indeed, it has been a source of conflict among
the circuit courts for over forty years.
The majority interpretation—the restored voluntariness view—
holds that subsection (c) was meant to remove some of the discretion
from trial judges in determining whether a confession was voluntary
because of a delay in presentation.52  Under the restored voluntari-
ness view, if there was delay in presenting the suspect before a magis-
trate, that delay cannot be the basis for excluding an otherwise
voluntary confession if obtained within six hours of the arrest.  Essen-
tially, subsection (c) carves out a “safe harbor” for police,53 allowing
them to interrogate for up to six hours without suppression con-
cerns.54  If the confession is obtained after the six hours, then subsec-
tions (a) and (b) control, and a trial judge can examine the amount of
time between arrest and arraignment to determine whether the con-
fession was voluntary.55  However, delay is only one factor in deter-
mining voluntariness and will not by itself be grounds to
automatically suppress a confession.56  This view eliminates McNabb
49. The majority in Corley v. United States acknowledged that if Congress had
stopped after subsection (b), the Court would have had to decide that the Mc-
Nabb-Mallory rule had been eliminated.
50. Courts and other authorities have not had difficulty in interpreting what must be
done with a voluntary confession obtained within the first six hours of an arrest.
51. 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009).
52. Compare United States v. Clarke, 110 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a
voluntary confession obtained more than twelve hours after the defendant’s ar-
rest and before her arraignment was admissible into evidence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501(c)), with United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding
that a voluntary confession obtained more than six hours after the defendant’s
arrest and before his arraignment before a magistrate should not be suppressed
under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c)).
53. See United States v. Senogles, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (D. Minn. 2008) (discussing
how 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) creates a “safe harbor” for police to interrogate a defen-
dant for up to six hours after an arrest without fearing suppression of a voluntary
confession obtained).
54. Id.
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(1) (2006).
56. Senogles, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.
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and Mallory because a trial judge ultimately makes a determination of
voluntariness.57
The opposing minority view—the modified delay view58—holds
that instead of removing some discretion from the trial judge, subsec-
tion (c) was enacted to limit or modify the absolute voluntariness test
of subsection (a).59  Under this view, if a confession is given within six
hours of arrest—within the “safe harbor”—but before presentation
before a magistrate, then subsection (a) will allow that confession to
be admitted if it is voluntary.  However, if the confession is given after
the six hour time limit, then subsection (a) no longer controls and the
McNabb-Mallory delay rule will automatically suppress the confession
if the trial court finds that the delay was unreasonable.60  Thus, the
unreasonable delay rule is modified to only apply to confessions
outside the six hour safe harbor.61  This minority view was the view
adopted by the Court in Corley v. United States62 and has put an end
to the circuit court split.  However, this view is not what Congress
intended when enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
D. Legislative Intent of Title II
The arguments for and against whether subsection (c) eliminates
the McNabb-Mallory rule generally involve a thorough analysis of the
legislative history behind subsection (c).63  The main question is
whether the legislative history shows that Congress meant to elimi-
nate McNabb-Mallory or only to carve out an exception for a six hour
delay.64  This brief subsection seeks to inform the reader about re-
57. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 382 (1943).
58. The “modified delay view” and “restored voluntariness view” are terms coined by
this author to help label the two interpretations of subsection (c).
59. See United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that a voluntary
confession obtained more than six hours after arrest and before presentation is
inadmissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c)); United States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that a voluntary confession obtained more than six
hours after arrest and before presentation is inadmissible under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501(c)). But see United States v. Christopher, 956 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1991)
(“Perez stands alone in its disregard for the statute’s focus on voluntariness and
will not be applied by this court.”).
60. See Matthew W. Frank, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Admissibility of Confessions
During Unnecessary Prearraignment Delay, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1731 (1986) (pro-
viding an analysis of the modified delay view).
61. See Perez, 733 F.2d 1026; Frank, supra note 60, at 1733.
62. 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009).
63. See United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970), for a thorough analy-
sis of the legislative intent behind 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
64. See United States v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1558
(2009); United States v. Ostrander, 411 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Clarke, 110 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Christopher, 956 F.2d 538
(6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1984); United
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-1\NEB106.txt unknown Seq: 10 26-AUG-10 9:10
2010] VOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS 193
vealing content in the legislative history and how courts and scholars
have interpreted that content.
The Senate Report on Title II states that the “enactment of subsec-
tions 3501 and 3502 . . . is needed to offset the harmful effects of the
Mallory case.”65  The Report continues, “[E]nactment of subsections
3501 and 3502 would assign proper weight to the Mallory rule.  Delay
in bringing a suspect before a committing magistrate would be a factor
to consider in determining the issue of voluntariness, but it would not
be the sole criterion to be considered.”66  The Report also states that
there is “no constitutional bar to congressional abrogation of the Mal-
lory rule” because the “rule is not based on any constitutional princi-
ple.”67  A straight-forward reading of the Senate Report on Title II
suggests that the McNabb-Mallory rule was abolished by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501, but, nevertheless, the Supreme Court and a few circuits held
that McNabb-Mallory was not intended to be abrogated.68
The reason for this minority view comes from a previous version of
subsection (c) that was later amended to the current form.  The origi-
nal subsection (c) did not have the six hour language, but instead indi-
cated that a confession would not be inadmissible solely because of
delay if the confession was found to be voluntary.69  Subsequently, an
amendment was introduced to amend this section to read that a con-
States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gaines, 555 F.2d
618 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Shoemaker, 542 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1976); Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v.
Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226 (9th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United
States v. Erving, 388 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D. Wis. 1975); United States v. Leland,
376 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del. 1974).
65. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 38 (1968).
66. Id. at 40–41.
67. Id. at 40.
68. See Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009) (holding section 3501 modi-
fies—but does not eliminate—the McNabb-Mallory rule); United States v. Pe-
rez,733 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that a confession obtained more than
six hours after arrest and before presentation was not reasonable and thus sub-
ject to suppression); United States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(holding that statements of a mental hospital inmate given to doctors and officers
were inadmissible because they violated the six hour requirement of subsection
(c)); United States v. Erving, 388 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D. Wis. 1975) (holding a delay
of 11 hours and 20 minutes in presenting the defendant before a magistrate vio-
lated subsection (c), thus suppressing the confession).
69. The previous subsection (c) read:
In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of
Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant
therein, while such person was under arrest or other detention in the
custody of any law-enforcement officer . . . shall not be inadmissible
solely because of delay in bringing such person before a commissioner or
other officer . . . if such confession is found voluntarily.
141 CONG. REC. 14,172 (1968).
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fession would not be inadmissible solely because of delay if the confes-
sion was voluntary and given within six hours of arrest.70  Thus, some
courts have taken the position that this provision was added simply to
put a time limit on the voluntary confession rule and not to completely
abrogate the McNabb-Mallory rule.71  These courts also hold that
without interpreting subsection (c) as modifying subsection (a) and
McNabb-Mallory, subsection (c) would be rendered superfluous.72
Many courts, however, take the position that the legislature indeed
intended to abrogate McNabb-Mallory.73  For example, United States
v. Halbert74 provides an extensive survey of the legislative history and
can be quite persuasive in arguing that Congress intended to abrogate
McNabb and Mallory. Legal scholars have also noted that Congress
intended to eliminate the McNabb-Mallory rule.  “Title II of the Omni-
bus Crime Control Act . . . was originally referred to the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary as a separate ‘anti-court’ bill.”75  Michael A.
LaFond states that the six hour provision was an attempt—though
ineffective in his view—at eliminating the McNabb-Mallory rule.76
Although the legislative history shows that Congress disliked the Mc-
Nabb-Mallory rule, the bigger question is why Congress found the rule
so unappealing?  Simply put, Congress felt that too many obviously
guilty suspects were getting off on technicalities.77  Members of Con-
gress were outraged that the public was paying the price when a vol-
untary confession proving guilt was suppressed because a police
70. Id.
71. Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009); United States v. Perez,733 F.2d
1026 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Erving, 388 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D. Wis. 1975);
United States v. Leland, 376 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del. 1974).
72. Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 1566 (“The fundamental problem with the Government’s
reading of § 3501 is that it renders § 3501(c) nonsensical and superfluous.”).
73. United States v. Ostrander, 411 F.3d 684, 695 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that pres-
entation delays in excess of six hours do not “standing alone” make a voluntary
confession suppressible); United States v. Clarke, 110 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a confession that is obtained more than six hours after arrest but
before presentation is not automatically excludable due to delay if the confession
is otherwise voluntary); United States v. Christopher, 956 F.2d 538 (6th Cir.
1991) (holding that the defendant’s statement does not have to be suppressed,
even if it is obtained more than six hours after arrest and prior to presentation
before a magistrate); United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970)
(holding that § 3501 was meant to abrogate the McNabb-Mallory rule and restore
a voluntariness test).
74. 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970).
75. Note, supra note 2, at 439.  Interestingly, during the time Title II was proposed,
there was also a proposed amendment that would make voluntariness of confes-
sions the sole test for admissibility, and if a trial court found a confession volun-
tary, it could not be reversed or disturbed by the Supreme Court.  Id. (citing S.J.
Res. 22, 90th Cong. (1967)).
76. Michael A. LaFond, Survey of Title II: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 AM. U. L. REV 157, 176 (1968).
77. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 37–40 (1968).
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officer made a mistake in getting the defendant arraigned without any
unnecessary delay.78  Moreover, many elected officials believed society
and the courts had become “obsessed” with uncovering new rights for
the defendants, which caused the scales of justice to become
“unbalanced.”79
The Senate Report also discusses the rising crime rate as a reason
for enacting Title II.  Specifically, the Report notes that the crime rate
in the District of Columbia rose by seventy-two percent in the sixteen
years prior to 1968, but the amount of felony convictions for these
crimes decreased by thirty-nine percent.80  The decisions in McNabb
and Mallory, which undoubtedly suppressed voluntary confessions
that established guilt, were targeted by Congress as one of the factors
contributing to the dramatic decrease in felony convictions.81  Thus,
Congress had every reason to abolish what it thought was an “illogical
and unrealistic” rule that made crime more prevalent in society.82
E. Circuit Split on the Interpretation of Subsection (c)
Some circuits have adopted the modified delay view, arguing sub-
section (c) was the only section aimed at McNabb and Mallory and did
nothing more than modify the rule.83  For example, in United States v.
Perez,84 the Second Circuit held that if subsection (c) did not modify
the pure voluntariness test of subsection (a), then subsection (c) would
be left meaningless.85  The court also stated that if voluntariness was
the only test that Congress wanted to adopt—thereby eliminating Mc-
Nabb and Mallory—then the statute would have contained language
that a confession would not be “involuntary” solely because of delay.86
However, since Congress said a confession will not be “inadmissible”
because of delay, the court held that Congress did not mean to adopt a
complete voluntariness test, and thus McNabb-Mallory is still ineffec-
78. Id. at 38.
79. Id. at 39.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 38.
83. See Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009); United States v. Perez, 733
F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Note, supra note 2, at 448–50 (explaining that
several courts thought that subsections (a) and (b) were meant to abrogate Mi-
randa, while only subsection (c) addressed the McNabb-Mallory rule).
84. 733 F.2d 1026 (1984).
85. The term “meaningless” is analogous to the term “superfluous” that the Court in
Corley uses to describe the interplay between subsection (a) and subsection (c).
See Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 1566.
86. Perez, 733 F.2d at 1031.
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tive after the six hour time frame.87  The Second Circuit has been the
main proponent of this minority view.88
A majority of the circuits have adopted the restored voluntariness
rule, holding 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was enacted in part to overrule McNabb
and Mallory.89  The principle case adopting this view was a Ninth Cir-
cuit case, United States v. Halbert.90  There, the court took the view
that subsections (a) and (b) work together to give the trial judge dis-
cretion in determining whether a confession is voluntary.91  Because
subsection (a) specifically says a confession will not be inadmissible if
it is voluntary, and (b) discusses factors determining voluntariness,
the court reasoned that subsection (c) is required to fit into this frame-
work.92  As the court stated, “[W]e cannot say that Congress intended
by the provision in subsection 3501(c) to undo all it had done with the
proceeding subsections.”93  Thus, the court held that subsection (c)
serves to remove some of the discretion under subsection (b)(1).94
This means that under subsection (c), a trial judge may not consider
the delay between arrest and arraignment as a factor to determine
involuntariness if the confession was made within six hours of arrest.
However, if the confession was obtained more than six hours after the
arrest, a trial judge would be free under subsection (b)(1) to consider
delay as a factor of involuntariness.95  Still, this holding does not say
that the confession is per se excluded if it occurred more than six
87. Id.
88. See Perez, 733 F.2d 1026.  However, in United States v. Christopher, the court
states that Perez stands alone in refusing to interpret voluntariness as the focus
of 18 U.S.C. § 3501.  956 F.2d 536, 539 (6th Cir. 1991).
89.  See United States v. Ostrander, 411 F.3d 684, 695 (6th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Clarke, 110 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Christopher, 956 F.2d
536 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Shoe-
maker, 542 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Campanile, 516 F.2d 288
(2d Cir. 1975); Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Keeble 459 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Halbert,
436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970).
90. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226.
91. Id. at 1234.
92. How subsection (c) works with subsections (a) and (b) is at the heart of this de-
bate.  The view in Halbert is that subsection (c) must fit into the framework of
subsections (a) and (b).  However, the view in Perez and Corley is that subsection
(c) controls and subsections (a) and (b) must fit into the framework of subsection
(c).
93. Halbert, 436 F.2d at 1234.
94. Id.  Subsection (b)(1) states that a trial judge may consider the time between ar-
rest and delay as one factor to determine if a confession is voluntary.  18 U.S.C.
§ 3501(b)(1) (2006).
95. Halbert, 436 F.2d at 1234.
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hours after arrest, because Congress replaced the unreasonable delay
test with a voluntariness standard.96
F. Facts and Background of Corley
By the time United States v. Corley97 came along, most courts held
that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 overruled the McNabb-Mallory rule and adopted
a totality of the circumstances test.98  Thus, the Third Circuit was on
firm ground when it decided that Corley’s confession, if it did occur
more than six hours after arrest, could be admitted because it was
voluntary.
Johnnie Corley was the suspect in a bank robbery in Penn-
sylvania.99  He was located by state and federal officers on September
17, 2003, when they were serving a warrant.100  When the police ar-
rived, Corley was pulling out of his driveway in his car.101  He almost
ran over one officer, then jumped out of his car, pushing another of-
ficer down, and ran.102  The officers chased Corley and arrested him
for assaulting an officer.103  He received minor injuries during the
chase.104
Corley was arrested at approximately 8:00 a.m.105  He was kept at
a local police station while the police questioned his neighbors.106  At
11:45 a.m. he was taken to a hospital to receive medical care, and was
released back to the police around 3:30 p.m.107  At this point, six hours
had already passed since his arrest.  Around 5:30 p.m., Corley began
an oral confession that lasted about an hour.108  When asked to put
96. Id.  A third view of subsection (c) was presented in United States v. Gaines, 555
F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1977).  There, a quasi hybrid analysis controls, suggesting the
trial court should be free to exclude a confession in excess of six hours (a violation
of McNabb) only if it would be a deterrent and further the goals of the exclusion-
ary rule.  If the police acted in good faith, the confession would not be suppressed
because of delay, because it would not deter the police. Id. at 623.
97. 500 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2007).
98. See Daniel Gandara, Admissibility of Confessions in Federal Prosecutions: Imple-
mentation of Section 3501 by Law Enforcement Officials and the Courts, 63 GEO.
L.J. 305 (1974) (“Federal courts now uniformly apply the ‘totality of the circum-
stances’ test of section 3501 to determine the admissibility of confessions made
during delay in bringing persons taken into custody before federal magistrates.”);
see also cases cited supra note 89 (collecting cases for the restored voluntariness
view).
99. Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1564 (2009).
100. Id. at 1564–65.
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the oral confession in writing, Corley stated that he would, but that he
was tired and wanted to resume in the morning.109  At 10:30 a.m. on
September 18, 2003, he began a written confession, which he signed at
1:30 p.m., over twenty-nine hours after his arrest.110
Corley’s confession was not suppressed under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c)
because the Third Circuit viewed it as voluntary.111  Even though it
was outside the six hour window,112 the Third Circuit believed that
since the confession was otherwise voluntary, it should be admitted
because voluntariness is the sole test.113  Consequently, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether subsection (c) elimi-
nated the rule in McNabb and Mallory, restoring the voluntariness
rule, or whether subsection (c) created a modified delay rule, where
any confession obtained after six hours would be automatically sup-
pressed unless due to a reasonable transportation delay.  The Su-
preme Court held that the modified delay rule is the correct
interpretation of subsection (c).114
III. ANALYSIS
In Corley v. United States,115 the Supreme Court was presented
with the issue of whether Congress intended 18 U.S.C. § 3501 to
wholly abrogate the rule in McNabb v. United States116 and Mallory v.
United States117 or to merely narrow the rule.  Specifically, the Su-
preme Court was to decide whether an arrested person’s confession
would be inadmissible if there was unreasonable delay in bringing
him or her before a judge.118  In a five-to-four opinion, Justice Souter
gave the opinion of the Court, which held that “Congress meant to
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See United States v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210, 220 (3rd Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct.
1558 (2009).
112. In Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009), the Government contends that
even if the Court holds the modified delay view, the confession should still be
admissible.  The Government argues that the confession was not outside the six
hour “safe harbor” because the clock should stop while Corley received medical
treatment.  This means his confession started within the six hour time frame—
even though it was not finished until later—and should be admissible. See Brief
for the United States at 47–48, Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009)
(No. 07-10441).  This issue will have to be determined on remand.
113. United States v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210, 220 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct.
1558 (2009).
114. Corley, 129 S. Ct. 1558.
115. Id.
116. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
117. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
118. Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 1562.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c), and as interpreted by the
Court, an unreasonable delay would be a delay exceeding six hours from arrest
until presentment before a magistrate. Id. at 1571.
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-1\NEB106.txt unknown Seq: 16 26-AUG-10 9:10
2010] VOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS 199
limit, not eliminate, McNabb-Mallory.”119  Justice Alito’s dissent ar-
gues that Congress meant to eliminate the McNabb-Mallory rule and
restore the old voluntariness test that existed prior to the McNabb-
Mallory line of cases.120
A. The Majority’s Argument
The thrust of the majority’s argument centers upon judicial canons
of statutory interpretation.  The majority recognizes that a conflict ex-
ists between subsections (a) and (c) of 18 U.S.C. § 3501.121  The two
interpretations of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 are as follows:  (1) subsection (a)
restores the voluntariness test that will always allow a confession to
be admissible so long as it is voluntary, no matter how long after an
arrest the confession is obtained; or (2) subsection (c) modifies subsec-
tion (a) to create a voluntariness test, so long as the confession is given
within six hours of arrest.122  The majority reasons that if the Court
were to adopt the first interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, subsection
(c) would be rendered “nonsensical and superfluous.”123  According to
the Court, if subsection (a) really means that any voluntary confession
is admissible no matter what, then subsection (c) could not add any-
thing of value because it could not limit subsection (a) with the six
hour time frame.124  Therefore, the majority believes that Congress
would not purposefully add a section into a statute that would be su-
perfluous, and if Congress did add a superfluous subsection, it would
be at odds with canons of statutory interpretation.125  This argument
provides the main reasoning allowing the majority to find that subsec-
tion (c) modifies subsection (a), and thus, Congress did not abrogate
the McNabb-Mallory rule.126  Instead, Congress created an “immuni-
zation”127 where voluntary confessions obtained during the first six
hours of arrest cannot be excluded because of delay—however, volun-
tary confessions obtained after six hours must be excluded if the de-
fendant had not yet been presented to a magistrate.128
119. Id. at 1562.
120. Id. at 1571 (Alito, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1566 (majority opinion).
122. Id. at 1564–66.
123. Id. at 1566.
124. Id.
125. Id.; see also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“A statute should be con-
strued so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inopera-
tive or superfluous, void or insignificant.”). But see Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 1572–73
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“There are times when Congress enacts provisions that are
superfluous, and this may be such an instance.”).
126. 129 S. Ct. at 1566.
127. Id. at 1564.
128. Id. at 1571.
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Even if subsection (c) is read as being vital to subsection (a) and
not superfluous, it does not necessarily mean that the pure voluntary
standard in subsection (a) only applies if it is within the six hour time
frame of subsection (c).  However, the Court makes this argument pri-
marily by examining the legislative history and concluding that Con-
gress did not intend to do away with the McNabb-Mallory rule.129
The reasoning behind this argument is that the original version of
subsection (c) contained no such six hour time frame, and that by
amending subsection (c) to include this six hour time frame, Congress
meant to modify—not eliminate—the McNabb-Mallory rule.130  By
linking cannons of statutory interpretation with the majority’s opinion
regarding the legislative intent, the majority in Corley was able to ar-
rive at an interpretation that does not completely abandon the Court’s
unreasonable presentation delay rule handed down in the McNabb-
Mallory line of cases.
For the most part, the dissent uses the same type of analysis but
arrives at a different conclusion.  First, the dissent argues that the
cannons of statutory interpretation provide that if the words of a stat-
ute are unambiguous, then judicial inquiry is complete.131  Under this
analysis, subsection (a) is unambiguous on its face: if the confession is
voluntary, it is admissible.  The dissent also argues that the legisla-
tive intent shows that Congress meant to eliminate the McNabb-Mal-
lory line of cases and restore the voluntariness test.132  This leads the
dissent to adopt the Government’s view that subsection (c) is not su-
perfluous, but has been wrongly read by the majority.133  Instead of
limiting subsection (a), subsection (c) restores the test of voluntariness
by specifically providing that if a confession is given within six hours,
then involuntariness will be the only factor to make a confession inad-
missible.134  This means that if there is no basis for delay in presenta-
tion other than coercion for a confession, the confession will be
automatically admissible if given within six hours.  If the confession is
given after the six hours, the confession is not automatically sup-
pressed (as the majority holds), but the trial judge may then consider
delay as one factor to determine if the confession was voluntary.135
This is the better view because it both serves to deter police officers
129. Id. at 1569.
130. Id. at 1568–70.  Section II.B explains the Court’s analysis of the legislative in-
tent.  But see United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970), for a more
thorough and contradictory analysis of the legislative history.
131. Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 1572 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)).
132. “The Senate Report clearly says that § 3501(a) was meant to reinstate the tradi-
tional rule that a confession should be excluded only if involuntary.” Id. at 1575.
133. Id. at 1573.
134. Id.
135. Id.
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-1\NEB106.txt unknown Seq: 18 26-AUG-10 9:10
2010] VOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS 201
acting in bad faith136 and also creates judicial autonomy to allow con-
victions of obviously guilty parties.
The problem with the views of the majority and the dissent is that
they fail take into account the policy behind the legislation and the
implications of what Congress was wishing to accomplish.137  This
Note argues that the dissent’s conclusion should be adopted, but for
reasons that go beyond the dissent’s argument.  The dissent’s view
should be adopted because it is consistent with legislative history and
because it allows trial judges the freedom to correctly determine the
voluntariness of a confession, while not allowing a guilty suspect to go
free on the basis of a technicality.
B. Legislative Intent
It is clear from the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 that Con-
gress fully intended to restore the old standard of voluntary confes-
sions and do away with the unreasonable delay rule of McNabb and
Mallory.  The Senate Report provides that “[t]he traditional right of
the people to have their prosecuting attorneys place in evidence before
juries the voluntary confessions and incriminating statements made
by defendants must be restored.”138  In addition, the Senate Report
indicates that “[18 U.S.C. § 3501] also assures that confessions made
while the suspect is under arrest shall not be inadmissible solely be-
cause of delay in bring[ing] the defendant before a magistrate or com-
missioner, and provides that nothing therein will bar from evidence a
voluntary, spontaneous, and unsolicited confession.”139  This state-
ment alone shows that Congress intended to restore a voluntary test,
with nothing—including a six hour or greater delay—blocking the ad-
missibility of that confession.140
136. Arguably, by excluding all confessions occurring after the six hour time period
the goal of deterrence is not met.  By allowing judges to look at the totality of the
circumstances, they can decide if police have acted in bad faith to coerce a confes-
sion. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (explaining that the deter-
rence principle only applies to police officers acting in bad faith because you
cannot deter police actions done in good faith).
137. Congress was trying to “offset the harmful effects of the Mallory case” and restore
a voluntariness test for confessions.  S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 38 (1968).  As dis-
cussed, the majority and dissent focus heavily on canons of interpretation with-
out getting at the real policy issues and implications on crime control that
Congress was concerned about when they enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
138. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 37 (1968); see also Stephan, supra note 1, at 193 (“In
response to a nation-wide increase in the occurrence of violent crime accompanied
by public demands for more efficient law enforcement . . . Congress has recently
enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.”).
139. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 37 (1968) (emphasis added).
140. Congress did not like that the public was paying the price for a police officer’s
blunder, and that price was an otherwise guilty suspect going free on a technical-
ity. See id. at 38.
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The Senate Report also states that section 3501 was enacted to
“offset the harmful effects of the Mallory cases.”141  Many public offi-
cials were of the view that the increasing crime rate and decreasing
felony conviction rate in Washington D.C. were directly related to con-
fessions becoming inadmissible due to presentation delays, even
though the confessions were voluntary.142  In response, Congress be-
lieved this bill would eliminate the McNabb-Mallory rule and make
the delay in bringing a suspect in front of a magistrate one factor in
determining voluntariness, but delay would not be the “sole criterion
. . . operating to automatically exclude an otherwise competent confes-
sion.”143  There is nothing in the Senate Reports or legislative history
that indicates Congress intended to do anything other than restore a
rule that confessions will be admissible so long as they are
voluntary.144
Many lower court decisions and some scholars have also indicated
that Congress was attempting to overrule the McNabb-Mallory line of
cases.  In United States v Gaines,145 the court notes that Congress did
not intend to broaden protection under McNabb-Mallory, a result
which may occur under one interpretation of subsection (c).146  The
most persuasive case is United States v. Halbert.147  There, the court
did an extensive review of the legislative history behind 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 and concluded that the statute was designed to overrule or off-
set the harmful effects of McNabb and Mallory.148  Scholarly work
also indicates that Congress wanted to overrule Mallory or, as one ar-
ticle has said, “emasculate” Mallory.149  While it is clear that Con-
141. Id.
142. Id. at 39.  Specifically, the Senate Report states that since the 1950s the crime
rate in the District of Columbia rose by seventy-two percent, but the felony con-
viction rate decreased thirty-nine percent.  Several senators attributed this to the
McNabb-Mallory presentation delay rule. Id.
143. Id. at 40–41.
144. See Brief for the United States, supra note 112, at 37 (“[R]emarks of Rep. McGre-
gor . . . ‘Section 3501(c) overrules the Mallory decision’ . . . remarks of Rep. Ander-
son . . . ‘Section 3501(c) does overrule the Mallory decision’ . . . remarks of Rep.
Reid . . . stating the bill ‘would reverse’ Mallory.”).
145. 555 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1977).
146. The majority’s view of subsection (c) may actually broaden Mallory and become
more of a burden upon police.  Under the McNabb-Mallory rule, unnecessary de-
lay did not include time spent waiting for arraignment over nights and weekends.
Now, under Corley’s holding, the police only have six hours to obtain the confes-
sion.  Nights and weekends do not stop the clock. See LaFond, supra note 76, at
173 n.119.
147. 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970).
148. Id. at 1236.  Other courts have reached similar conclusions that Congress meant
to overrule Mallory. See cases cited supra note 89.
149. Note, supra note 2, at 450–51; see also Gandara, supra note 98, at 306 (“Congress
also sought to modify the Court’s 1957 decision in Mallory v. United States and
thus to diminish the impact of delays in arraignment on the admissibility of con-
fessions.”); Kurt L. Sundberg, Commonwealth v. Duncan: Prearraignment Delay
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gress fully intended to restore the voluntariness test and overrule
Mallory, this naturally leads to the question of what purpose subsec-
tion (c) has in 18 U.S.C. § 3501.  Legislative history, judicial interpre-
tation, and other scholarly works help resolve this conflict in a way
that furthers the policy aims that Congress articulated in the Senate
Report.
To begin, it is very important to take note of what subsection (c)
does not say.  Nowhere in subsection (c) does Congress ever mandate
exclusion of a confession obtained after the six hour window.150  Al-
though the majority read this interpretation into subsection (c), such a
reading is not evident on its face.  What subsection (c) does say is that
a trial judge is prohibited from using presentation delay as a reason
for holding a confession inadmissible if the delay is within six hours of
arrest.151  While subsection (a) was designed to give more freedom
and autonomy to trial judges to allow a confession if the judge deter-
mines it was voluntary, Congress was concerned that a judge might
determine under subsection (b)(1) that a presentation delay was un-
reasonable and, because of the delay, exclude the voluntary confes-
sion.152  Thus, subsection (c) removes some discretion from the trial
judge and tells the trial judge that delay cannot be the reason for de-
termining a confession is inadmissible if that confession was produced
within six hours of arrest.  If the confession was produced after six
hours, the trial judge can use the delay in determining whether the
confession was voluntary.153  Under this view of subsection (c), a delay
and the Failure of the Exclusionary Rule as a Remedy, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1159,
1163 (1988) (“The general view is that the effect of section 3501(c) is to overrule
the McNabb-Mallory rule.”); Matthew M. Walton, People v. Cipriano: Admissibil-
ity of Confessions Made During Unnecessary Prearrangement Delays, 1989 DE-
TROIT. C.L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1989) (“Cases following Omnibus have essentially
overruled McNabb and Mallory.  Also, a majority of the federal courts following
Omnibus removed delay alone as a cause for rejecting evidence, and focused in-
stead upon the voluntariness of a confession as the proper test for
admissibility.”).
150. United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1233, n.5 (9th Cir. 1970); see also United
States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d  757, 761 (8th Cir. 1972) (“[Subsection (c)] does not say
that a delay of more than six hours makes the confession automatically inadmis-
sible.”); Brief for the United States, supra note 112, at 17 (“The text of Section
3501(c) does not announce any exclusionary rule and . . . does not mandate the
exclusion of confessions taken more than six hours after arrest based on unrea-
sonable delay in presentation to a magistrate.  That textual omission of any ex-
clusionary rule should be the end of the matter.”).
151. Halbert, 436 F.2d at 1234; see also Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d
914, 924 (3d Cir. 1974) (“Section 3501(c) modifies the trial judge’s freedom to de-
termine voluntariness by stating certain instances in which the judge cannot on
the basis of delay alone find a statement to have been involuntary.”).
152. Brief for the United States, supra note 112, at 17.
153. This is consistent with the statutory language of subsection (c) because nowhere
in the statute does it say a confession is automatically excludable if obtained
more than six hours after an arrest.
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past the six hour window does not automatically trigger exclusion, as
the majority in Corley would require.154
Subsection (b)(1) also helps to shed light on the view that subsec-
tion (c) takes away some discretion from a trial judge.  Subsection (b)
provides the trial judge with factors in determining if a confession is
voluntary.155  Subsection (b)(1) instructs the trial court to give consid-
eration to the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment if the
confession was made after the arrest but before the arraignment.156
Thus, subsection (a) instructs the trial judge to use a voluntariness
test to determine if a confession is admissible, and then subsection (b)
instructs the trial judge to use the amount of time between arrest and
presentment to determine voluntariness.  Subsection (c), then, cannot
be read as Congress undoing all of the work that it had done in subsec-
tions (a) and (b).157  “[S]ubsection 3501(c) . . . merely removes some of
the discretion given to the trial judge under subsection 3501(b) in de-
termining voluntariness.  Discretion remains in the trial judge under
subsection 3501(b), to exclude confessions as involuntary solely be-
cause of delay in arraignment during which a confession is given that
exceeds six hours.”158  Stated another way:
Although somewhat ambiguous, subsections (b)(1) and (c) together provide
that a confession otherwise voluntary and made within six hours is admissible
without reference to delay and that a confession made after a delay of more
than six hours may be admissible if the trial judge determines that the confes-
sion is voluntary in view of ‘all the circumstances’ surrounding the
confession.159
154. The majority reaches this view incorrectly because it assumes that Congress
never meant to eliminate Mallory. See Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558,
1568–70 (2009).  Once Mallory is eliminated and the voluntariness test is re-
stored, it is easy to see that Congress wanted to make sure that a judge is not
using presentation delay as grounds to always throw out voluntary confessions.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (2006).
156. Id. § 3501(b)(1).
157. United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1970);  Brief for the
United States, supra note 112, at 18 (“[S]uch an implication [of subsection (c)]
cannot be drawn where it would override the affirmative command of Section
3501(a) that all voluntary confessions ‘shall be admissible in evidence.’”). But see
Thomas J. Miller, The Six-hour Delay: A Confession Killer, 33 U. PITT. L. REV.
341, 351 (1971) (arguing that this interpretation of subsection (c) would not
“undo” the provisions created in subsections (a) and (b)).
158. Halbert, 436 F.2d at 1234. This interpretation has been stated another way:
Title II would modify the McNabb-Mallory rule to the extent that no de-
lay of less than six hours would be considered ‘unreasonable’ regardless
of the circumstances and no confession obtained during such a period
would be inadmissible per se.  In cases where the delay was more than
six hours, the trial judge could admit the confession if he felt that it was
voluntary and if he was convinced that the factors causing the delay . . .
were reasonable.
Stephan, supra note 1, at 200.
159. Gandara, supra note 98, at 310–11.
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While the majority in Corley argues for a per se exclusionary rule
for confessions obtained more than six hours after arrest (unless ac-
companied with a reasonable transportation delay pursuant to section
(c)),160 such a per se reading of subsection (c) is not valid.  The major-
ity argues that this statute needs to be read as a whole.161  When the
statute is read as a whole, it makes sense that the restored voluntary
rule—not the Court’s holding—is the correct statutory interpreta-
tion.162
Prior acts of Congress also provide evidence against adopting a per
se exclusionary rule for confessions obtained more than six hours after
an arrest but before presentation.  In 1943, Congress attempted to
pass the Hobbs Bill163 to overrule McNabb, but the attempt was un-
successful.164  Then, in 1967, Congress “renewed its attack” on the
McNabb-Mallory rule by passing Title III of the District of Columbia
Crime Control Bill.165  This bill provided a three hour restriction on
the unnecessary delay rule of Mallory for the District of Columbia.166
With this bill, Congress specifically stated its intentions for the admis-
sibility of confessions that were given more than three hours after ar-
rest.  The Congressional Report makes clear that Title III was not
intended to prohibit the admissibility of confessions made after the
three hour period has expired.167
Not surprisingly, section 3501 was modeled after Title III of the
District of Columbia Crime Control Bill.168  During the debate on the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Senator Scott said,
“[Subsection (c)] is an attempt to conform, as nearly as practicable, to
160. Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1571 (2009).
161. Id. at 1566 n.5.
162. Interestingly, neither the majority nor the dissent discuss the importance of sec-
tion (b)(1) in interpreting section (c).  By failing to discuss this section, the major-
ity fails to follow its own opinion about statutory interpretation, and the dissent
never considers this persuasive argument.  One possible reason the majority does
not discuss this argument is that the majority considered section (a) and (b) to
only pertain to Congress’ attempt to overrule Miranda.  The majority says that
only section (c) applies to Mallory. See Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558,
1564 (2009).  However, as shown, the whole of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was meant to
overrule Mallory, not just subsection (c).
163. H.R. 3690, 78th Cong. (1943).
164. Note, supra note 2, at 450 n.79.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Gandara, supra note 98, at 319–20 n.91 (citing S. REP. NO. 90-912, at 17 (1967)).
The cited Senate Report goes on to say that if a confession is given after the three
hour period, it will not be protected under Title III, but may still be admitted as
long as the confession does not violate other constitutional rights. S. REP. NO. 90-
912, at 17 (1967).  Like 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c), Congress was intending to make sure
a confession would not be held involuntary solely because of a delay in presenta-
tion, provided the delay was not more than three hours.
168. Gandara, supra note 98, at 320.
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title III of Public Law 90-226, the District of Columbia crime bill
. . . .”169  The District of Columbia Crime Control Bill was designed to
abrogate Mallory, and the legislative history indicates that a confes-
sion after three hours is not per se inadmissible.170  The three hours
clause expressly authorizes police to interrogate a suspect for three
hours before presenting him or her before a magistrate, without fear
that the confession will be held inadmissible because of the delay.171
Likewise, subsection (c) sought to make the three hour period longer
by allowing the police to interrogate for six hours without fear that the
confession will be deemed inadmissible because of presentation de-
lay.172  Since Congress modeled subsection (c) after the District of Co-
lumbia Crime Control Bill, and since the Bill specifically indicates
that a confession after three hours of arrest but before delay is not per
se inadmissible, it follows that Congress did not intend to create a per
se inadmissibility rule under 18 U.S.C. §3501(c).  Rather, Congress
was intending to provide immunity for police to interrogate up to six
hours after arrest but before presentment.  Under this reasoning, if
the interrogation lasts longer than six hours, the police will not get the
protection afforded by subsection (c) but will be at the mercy of a judge
who will determine under section (a) and (b) if the confession was
truly voluntary.173  This is the conclusion reached in Halbert174 which
provides the correct interpretation of section 3501.175
Analysis of legislative intent demonstrates that Congress meant to
overrule McNabb-Mallory.  However, the courts were still left to
struggle with how subsection (c) fits into subsections (a) and (b).  After
considering these three subsections as a whole, and what Congress
was trying to accomplish—providing a safe harbor for police to inter-
rogate for up to six hours—it becomes apparent that the majority in
Corley was not correct.  Congress meant to restore the voluntariness
standard and specifically provided that delay will not be a factor of
involuntariness within the first six hours of arrest.  Furthermore, if
the confession was after six hours, Congress did not intend to default
to the per se exclusionary rule of McNabb-Mallory.  Rather, Congress
169. 141 CONG. REC. 14,184 (1968).
170. See S. REP. NO. 90-912, at 17.
171. Gandara, supra note 98, at 319–20.
172. Id. Originally, Congress did not have a fixed time period.  However, Senator
Scott (who introduced the enacted version of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c)) was worried
that the “open-endedness” of the original subsection (c) would be deemed uncon-
stitutional by the courts.  141 CONG. REC. 14,185 (1968).  Senator Scott thought
that this problem could be fixed by only allowing the police a six hour time frame
to interrogate suspects before they had to worry about the confession being sup-
pressed on coercive grounds. See id.
173. See discussion infra subsection III.D.2.
174. 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970).
175. Gandara, supra note 98, at 320.
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abrogated McNabb-Mallory to restore judicial discretion in determin-
ing voluntariness.
C. Negative Implications of the Majority’s Rule
One problem with the majority’s decision is that it creates an in-
flexible rule that leaves trial judges without any ability to use their
discretion to decide if a confession should be admitted.  Often, the sus-
pect is guilty of the crime and has confessed without any coercion, but
because of a delay not specifically listed in subsection (c), the guilty
suspect cannot be convicted because his confession is inadmissible.176
One prominent example concerns a situation where a suspect is ar-
rested during the weekend.  While the local courts are not in session,
the suspect may stay the night in jail, awake the next morning, and
give a voluntary confession.  However, under the Court’s modified de-
lay rule, the confession must be suppressed because his confession did
not take place within the six hour safe harbor of subsection (c).177  The
trial court would not be free to use its own discretion to determine that
the statement is clearly admissible.  Under the dissent’s opinion and
Congress’ true intent, a judge would be free to admit this voluntary
confession.
Hypotheticals like this have led the modified delay view of subsec-
tion (c) to be seen as even more of a burden upon police enforcement
than the McNabb-Mallory rule itself.178  Under the McNabb-Mallory
rule, many courts held that a weekend arrest that did not result in
presentation before a magistrate until the following Monday was a
reasonable delay.179  Also, “delays of far longer than six hours have
frequently been held proper, for reasons other than problems of trans-
portation to the nearest magistrate.”180  Soon after 18 U.S.C. § 3501
was enacted by Congress, scholars recognized that it was possible to
interpret subsection (c) as imposing more restrictions than the Mc-
Nabb-Mallory rule imposed.181  However, it seems that no one
thought the Court would interpret subsection (c) the way that Corley
has because the legislative intent appears clear.182  The Supreme
Court has now interpreted subsection (c) in a way that has the poten-
176. Importantly, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) only specifically lists reasonable delays due to
transportation as an exception to the six hour rule.
177. See LaFond, supra note 76, at 173 n.119.
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing United States v. Doyle, 373 F.2d 875 (2d. Cir. 1967)).
180. United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir. 1970) (citing 1 WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 72, at 74 (4th ed. 2008)).
181. Id.; see also LaFond, supra note 76, at 173 n.119 (“Title II becomes more of a
burden on the police then [sic] the McNabb-Mallory rule because they would have
only six hours, and not all night or all weekend, to interrogate.”).
182. See LaFond, supra note 76, at 173 n.119 (“[The modified delay view of section(c)]
is contrary . . . to the basic motive of Congress in enacting Title II, to free law
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tial to be far more restrictive than the McNabb-Mallory rule itself.183
This is contrary to what Congress intended.
Prior to the Court’s holding in Corley, there were some cases that
would have completely thwarted the efforts of Congress and the exer-
cise of judicial discretion had they been decided under Corley.  For ex-
ample, in United States v. Manuel,184 the defendant was intoxicated
when he was arrested.185  Once he was sober, he made a voluntary
confession to the police, but this confession occurred more than six
hours after his arrest and before presentation before a magistrate.186
The court in Manuel noted that if the police did interrogate the defen-
dant during the first six hours after his arrest, they would have cre-
ated a situation that would have produced an unfair and involuntary
confession because of the defendant’s intoxication.187  However, under
the current Corley rule, this confession must be suppressed because it
was beyond the six hour window and was not the result of a transpor-
tation delay.  This type of result was exactly the situation Congress
was trying to avoid by enacting section 3501.188
Even in Corley itself the Court has created some negative implica-
tions.  In Corley, the defendant was arrested as a suspect in a bank
robbery, but was injured during the arrest.189  He was arrested at
8:00 a.m. and was taken to a hospital where he stayed and received
treatment until 3:30 p.m.190  At 5:27 p.m., Corley orally confessed to
the bank robbery.  He was asked to put the confession in writing, but
was allowed to wait until the next morning so he could rest.191  At
enforcement of the restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court.  The actual mean-
ing of the six-hour provision will have to be determined by the courts.”).
183. Stephan, supra note 1, at 201, also discusses this burden.  Stephan argues that
federal courts that have interpreted the McNabb-Mallory rule have upheld as
reasonable delays of one or two days “so long as the delay was prompted by una-
voidable circumstances.” Id. He goes on to state that subsection (c), in effect,
allows the police to gather additional evidence “by obtaining a ‘voluntary confes-
sion’” within six hours of arrest. Id.  However, under the Court’s interpretation
in Corley a trial court is more burdened because they cannot account for “una-
voidable circumstances.”
184. 706 F.2d 908 (9th Cir.1983).
185. Id. at 910.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Senator Alan Bible stated that “we have become obsessed with uncovering new
rights and safeguards for the criminal to such a degree that we have unbalanced
the scales of justice, and find ourselves in the unenviable position of losing con-
trol of the crime and violence that are running rampant in our cities . . . .”  S. REP.
NO. 90-1097, at 39 (1968).
189. Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1564 (2009).
190. Id. at 1565
191. Id.
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10:30 the next morning, he began writing the written confession,
which he did not sign until over twenty-nine hours after his arrest.192
Although the confession may still be admissible on remand,193
under the Court’s holding, Corley’s voluntary confession is inadmissi-
ble because the confession took place more than six hours after the
arrest.  Because subsection (c) does not contain an exception other
than for transportation delays, the medical treatment and Corley’s re-
quest for sleep may not matter.  However, as in Manuel, it is both
more fair and less coercive for the police to provide the defendant with
medical treatment and rest before they begin an interrogation.  By fol-
lowing the dissent’s view, the judge is free to exercise judicial discre-
tion to determine whether the confession was truly voluntary,
regardless of the amount of time between arrest and arraignment.194
D. Policy Reasons for Adopting the Dissenting Opinion
1. Statutory Interpretation and Supervisory Powers
Prior to the 1930s, the Supreme Court’s role in supervising the
lower courts was minimal.195  When McNabb was decided in 1943, it
was generally seen as the first supervisory power decision, marking a
turning point for the Court.196 McNabb was specifically decided so
that the Supreme Court could “dissociate the federal courts from the
unlawful investigative techniques that had been employed in that
case and many others.”197  With this new supervisory function, the
Court was able to begin creating rules of procedure.  This was done in
two ways.  First, in the 1930s, Congress shifted from creating rules of
procedure to allowing the judicial branch to create its own rules of
procedure.198  Accordingly, the Supreme Court would create rules that
would be submitted to Congress for review, ensuring Congress could
view the rule before it came into effect.199  The second way for a proce-
dural rule to be created is if the Court creates a supervisory rule
192. Id.
193. The Government contends that even if subsection (c) only narrowed McNabb and
Mallory and did not abrogate them, the six hour clock should have paused when
Corley was receiving medical attention, and thus the confession may yet fall
within the six hour safe harbor.  Brief for the United States, supra note 112, at 8.
194. It should be noted that nothing in the record indicates that the police were pur-
posely trying to delay presentation to get a confession.  The lower courts found
that the confession was completely voluntary, and the only issue was that it was
outside of the six hour window. See United States v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210 (3d Cir.
2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009).
195. Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitu-
tional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1433, 1438 (1984).
196. Id. at 1435.
197. Id. at 1445.
198. Id. at 1467.
199. Id. at 1483.
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through a holding in a particular case.200  This was exactly what has
happened in the McNabb-Mallory line of cases.201
Since McNabb was a decision based on the supervisory powers of
the Court, and not a constitutional holding,202 Congress can permissi-
bly respond by enacting statutes to change any judicially created, non-
constitutional procedural rules.  As previously discussed, the legisla-
tive history and intent demonstrate that Congress overruled McNabb-
Mallory and restored the voluntariness test with a specific six-hour
safe harbor for presentation delays.203  As this is what Congress en-
acted—and had the power to do204—why did the majority interpret
this statute as only limiting McNabb and Mallory?  Why did the Court
not interpret 18 U.S.C. § 3501 as overruling McNabb and Mallory as
Congress intended?
While there may be no clear answer, one answer may be that the
majority’s decision aims to reinforce the Court’s ability to function as a
supervisory power.205  Congress was quite concerned about decisions
that followed Mallory.206  Mainly, Congress was outraged over Alston
v. United States207 because the court held that five minutes between
arrest and presentation was deemed to be an unreasonable delay
under Mallory.208  In a way, by enacting section 3501, Congress
struck a mighty blow to a line of cases where the supervisory power
200. Id.
201. Interestingly, the Supreme Court had misinterpreted the facts of McNabb, as
well as the statutory basis, resulting in creation of the unnecessary delay rule.
The statute in question was about preventing federal marshals from collecting
unreasonable travel fees. Id. at 1448.  It was not intended to prevent prolonged
interrogation, but the Supreme Court, under its “supervisory power,” created a
judicial rule nonetheless. Id.
202. See Note, supra note 2, at 451 (“[T]he roots of McNabb and Mallory run no deeper
than the supervisory powers of the Supreme Court and that the case’s holding
embodies only a rule of evidence subject to congressional control and is not a
constitutional safeguard beyond the scope of legislative control.”); Stephan, supra
note 1, at 207 (“The McNabb and Mallory holdings were not based on constitu-
tional principles, but rather they were an interpretation of Rule (5)(a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure.”).
203. Beale, supra note 195, at 1484.
204. See Stephan, supra note 1, at 194 (stating that modifying McNabb-Mallory is
within the power of the legislature because McNabb-Mallory is not based on con-
stitutional principles).
205. Beale argues that the Court has no such supervisory power:  “Supervisory power
as such does not exist.  The supervisory power label has been used to describe the
exercise of several different forms of judicial power.  Use of the term supervisory
power has diverted attention from the nature, source, and limits of the authority
being exercised in each case.”  Beale, supra note 195, at 1520.
206. Stephan, supra note 1, at 193 (stating Congress viewed the increased occurrence
of “violent crime” as a result of several Supreme Court decisions, including
Mallory).
207. 348 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
208. S. REP No. 90-1097, at 38 (1968).
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was first developed.  In turn, by the majority holding that Congress
has not overruled this line of cases but has only limited them, it can be
argued that the Court is seeking to assert judicial control against con-
gressional intrusion.  However, because the McNabb-Mallory rule is
not based on the Constitution, Congress has every right—as it
should—to consider what society needs and to make laws accordingly.
Under this view, the policy implications of Corley may be larger
than what appears on its face.  In a roundabout way, the Court has
now said that it can maintain its supervisory power, so long as the
Court can find a possible interpretation of a statute that fits their
view, regardless of what Congress intended when they enacted the
statute.209  The dissent, however, used careful analysis of the legisla-
tive history and statutory construction to arrive at a conclusion that
does not overstep the boundaries set by Congress in section 3501.  The
dissenting opinion, therefore, should be adopted because it uses judi-
cial restraint and respects the distinction between when the Court has
the authority to enact rules and when it must follow the intentions of
Congress.
2. Judicial Autonomy and Discretion
The previous subsection argues that Congress recognized that ap-
plication of Mallory was impracticable and created numerous barriers
to convicting known guilty suspects.210  The Alston case211 is a good
example of the problems that arose under McNabb-Mallory.  When
Congress sought to overrule Mallory, Congress intended to restore the
voluntariness test, which would create much needed judicial auton-
omy so that trial judges could admit a confession by examining the
totality of the circumstances in which it was made.
In United States v. Gaines212 the Seventh Circuit recognized the
importance of interpreting subsection (c) to promote judicial autonomy
and discretion:  “We think it clear that a district court judge retains
discretion to exclude a confession where there is a delay in excess of
209. It should be noted that the premise of this argument rests upon legislative intent.
This author is of the view that the legislative intent is rather clear as to how 18
U.S.C. § 3501 should be interpreted.  However, there are scholars that would ar-
gue the majority’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 is what the legislature in-
tended. See Frank, supra note 60.
210. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 38 (1968).
211. 348 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that a five minute delay between arrest and
arraignment was an unreasonable delay, resulting in suppressed confession). Al-
ston demonstrates why Congress adopted subsection (c):  if a court could consider
a five-minute delay “unreasonable,” then subsection (c) would eliminate the risk
of a future judge making the same determination “solely because of delay.” See S.
REP. NO. 90-1097, at 38 (1968).
212. 555 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1977).
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-1\NEB106.txt unknown Seq: 29 26-AUG-10 9:10
212 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:184
six hours.”213  The court then discussed the importance of including
factors like police deterrence, judicial integrity, and whether admit-
ting confessions after six hours would encourage violations of the
Fourth Amendment.214  Under the Corley Court’s view, a trial judge
cannot even take these factors into account because the judge is forced
to exclude a confession that was made more than six hours after ar-
rest, even though it was completely voluntary.  However, in many
cases judicial integrity and societal interest demand that the confes-
sion be admitted, and arguments like police deterrence may not be
relevant.
United States v. Keeble215 also supports the argument that subsec-
tion (c) has been designed to promote judicial autonomy and discre-
tion.  In Keeble, the court discusses how subsection (c) “complements
subsections (a) and (b), and does not say that a delay of more than six
hours makes the confession automatically inadmissible.”216  The Kee-
ble court concludes that a court may consider the delay between arrest
and arraignment and still find that a confession was voluntary under
subsection (b) and is thus admissible under subsection (a).217  Conse-
quently, a court does need to consider the delay period, but has the
freedom to make a true determination of voluntariness that will pro-
mote judicial integrity, Fourth Amendment values, and societal inter-
ests in dealing with crime.
Furthermore, United States v. Halbert218 says that subsection (b)
was designed to “instruct the trial judge to consider delay in arraign-
ment in determining the voluntariness of a confession but leaves him
with a great deal of discretion on what to make of it.”219  Subsection (b)
demonstrates that Congress intended for trial judges to have a good
amount of latitude to make judicial determinations: Congress wanted
the trial courts to be more autonomous to serve the interests of justice.
The Corley Court’s view of subsection (c) only grants judicial auton-
omy during a six hour window.  This is not what Congress had in
mind.220  Instead, Halbert correctly states that if a confession is other-
wise voluntary, subsection (c) “merely removes some of the discretion
given to the trial judge”221 under subsection (b) by mandating that the
213. Id. at 623.
214. Id.
215. 459 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1972).
216. Id. at 761.
217. Id.
218. 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970).
219. Id. at 1234 (emphasis added).
220. Outside the six hour safe harbor, Congress wanted the trial judge to be able to
determine whether a confession was voluntary by taking into account all of the
circumstances surrounding that confession. Gandara, supra note 98, at 311.
221. Halbert, 436 F.2d at 1234.
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trial judge cannot exclude a confession solely because of delay if the
confession is given within six hours after the arrest.222
Other legal authorities touch on the importance of judicial discre-
tion in allowing voluntary confessions to be admissible.  The Michigan
Supreme Court moved away from the McNabb-Mallory rule and
adopted a balancing test, where the trial court would consider several
factors to determine if a confession is voluntary and should be admis-
sible.223  Under this test, a trial judge would consider, among other
things, age, education, intelligence, previous police experience, length
of questioning, unnecessary presentation delay, and intoxication.224
It has also been suggested that a voluntariness test enables a judge
to examine the “attendant circumstances” to see if the confession re-
sulted from “pressures having overborne the will of the defendant.”225
To see if the suspect’s will has been overborne, the “ ‘circumstances of
pressure’ must be weighed against the ‘power of resistance of the per-
son confessing.’”226  The court in United States v. Clarke227 has also
stated that the “underlying concern of § 3501 is to ensure that a sus-
pect’s will is not overborne when making a confession.”228  Congress
intended to abrogate the McNabb-Mallory rule to determine volunta-
riness, but in doing so a suspect still has Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights.229  Thus, by adopting the dissent’s view, the Court would
stay true to the legislative intent and be able to use Michigan’s balanc-
ing test230 to ensure that will of the defendant is not overborne.231
This is a superior view because it may result in a greater number of
truly guilty suspects being convicted, while still ensuring that no pro-
tected rights have been infringed.
222. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (2006).  While Congress wanted to promote judicial discretion
and allowing courts to take into account all circumstances surrounding the con-
fession, Congress also wanted to stop the police practices in cases like Alston.  See
supra note 213 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d
1026 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting the view that subsection (c) “merely removes” some
discretion and taking the view of Corley, removing judicial discretion outside of
six hours).
223. Walton, supra note 149, at 1301–02.
224. Id. at 1302.
225. Sundberg, supra note 149, at 1164.
226. Id. at 1164 n.27 (citing Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184–85 (1953)).
227. 110 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1997).
228. Id. at 615.
229. See discussion supra section III.C.
230. See Walton, supra note 149, at 1302.
231. But see Meredith J. Rund, Breathing Life into the “Working Arrangement” Rule:
Maintaining a Federal Deterrent in Joint Federal-State Law Enforcement Opera-
tions, 66 UMKC L. REV. 496 (arguing that the six hour time limit of subsection (c)
was meant to exclude any confession obtained outside of that time limit, and thus
Clarke was wrongly decided).  However, Rund does not delve into the policy im-
plications that make the holding in Clarke a better view.
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Finally, there is a need for trial judges to be able to account for
harmless error and not operate under rules that are needlessly strict.
Prior to the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the American Law Insti-
tute was already promulgating a similar code section.232  Researcher
Jeffery C. Munnell indicates that this provision, like subsection (c),
had a safe harbor where police could interrogate without violating
prompt presentation requirements.233  However, Munnell argues that
a confession obtained after the time limit would not require “absolute
exclusion.”234  Munnell recognizes that many times violations are the
result of “harmless error,” and the confession would be otherwise vol-
untary.235  Munnell’s view proves persuasive.  Many times the reason
for the presentation delay is the result of “harmless error.”  In those
circumstances, the trial judge should be free to use judicial discretion
to arrive at a conclusion that furthers the spirit of section 3501.  In
sum, section 3501 was not intended to be needlessly strict, thereby
hindering the convictions of obviously guilty parties.
Under the dissent’s view, the courts are free to balance numerous
factors (presentation delay among them) to accurately determine if a
confession is voluntary, which may result in more convictions of guilty
suspects.  Many courts have been in favor of a pure voluntariness
standard—not a reasonable delay standard—for admitting confes-
sions.236  Also, nearly every state has refused to adopt the McNabb-
Mallory rule and instead maintains a voluntariness test when it
comes to confessions.237  In doing so, “the determination of voluntari-
ness, and thus the admissibility of a confession, is left entirely to the
discretion of the trial judge.”238  As the following section demon-
strates, this judicial discretion is critical to preserve judicial integrity
and not allow an obviously guilty defendant to walk free because of
harmless error.
3. Judicial Integrity and Technicalities
During the Senate debates on 18 U.S.C. § 3501, Senator McClellan
made a direct argument for the passages of Title II of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.  He stated, “Supreme Court deci-
232. Munnell, supra note 32, at 335–38.
233. Id. at 337.
234. Id. at 338.
235. Id. at 338–39.
236. See John E. Betts, Criminal Procedure—Exclusionary Rule—Evidence Obtained
From Defendant During Period of Unnecessary Delay in Presenting Him Before a
Judicial Officer Subject to Exclusion under M.D.R. 723(a).  Johnson v. State, 282
Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978), 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 562, 562 (1979).
237. Id.  The only states that have adopted a per se rule excluding confessions solely
because of delay are Delaware, Maryland, Montana, and Pennsylvania.  Sund-
berg, supra note 149, at 1988.
238. Gandara, supra note 98, at 310.
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sions in the field of criminal procedure were wrecking the morale and
effectiveness of American law enforcement and destroying the faith of
citizens in the ability of their governments to protect them from
crime.”239  Senator McClellan went on to argue that without the con-
gressional intervention of section 3501, the courts would continue to
“free the ‘obviously guilty’ on ‘dubious and minor technicalities.’”240
After reading Senator McClellan’s remarks, one has a sense that
members of Congress were outraged by the thought of guilty people
going free merely because of unreasonable presentation delay, even if
they were not coerced into confessing to the crime.
To begin, there are two purposes behind the exclusionary rule: (1)
deterrence—to keep law enforcement officials from engaging in illegal
practices; and (2) protecting the basic rights of the public by ensuring
that a person will not be convicted based upon evidence obtained in
violation of his or her basic rights.241 McNabb and Mallory were
based on these two purposes.242  However, the Miranda rules have
rendered these reasons irrelevant.243  Thus, while an exclusionary
rule based on presentation delay once served a purpose, many courts
believe that the reasons for the McNabb-Mallory rule “have been elim-
inated by constitutional development[s] . . . and accordingly have
moved back again toward the issue of voluntariness in determining
the admissibility of a confession.”244  Because the reasons for the un-
reasonable delay rule have been virtually eliminated by Miranda,
courts are now forced under Corley to suppress voluntary confessions
that fail to meet needlessly strict technical requirements.  The pur-
pose of 18 U.S.C. §3501 is to convict more obviously guilty suspects,
but the Court’s holding thwarts that purpose.
The problem with such a technical requirement is that circum-
stances beyond an officer’s or prosecutor’s control may result in sup-
pression of a confession.  For example, if a judicial officer is
unavailable due to other pressing judicial business or the time of day,
an arraignment may not occur within six hours.245  Or, the delay
could be the result of “immediate medical attention” needed for either
the arrestee or the arresting officer.246  As the Government argues in
239. Thornton Robinson, Police Interrogation of Suspects: The Court Versus the Con-
gress, 57 CAL. L. REV. 740, 757 (1969).
240. Id.
241. Munnell, supra note 32, at 332.
242. Id.
243. Id. Another reason for the McNabb-Mallory rule was to prevent “third degree”
tactics, which have declined dramatically since the time of McNabb. Id.
244. Walton, supra note 149, at 1304.
245. Carol J. Young, Criminal Procedure:  Statements Made During a Prearraignment
Delay That Exceeds Six Hours Ruled Inadmissible in Pennsylvania, 23 VILL. L.
REV. 366, 379 (1978).  This issue can be especially problematic in rural areas. Id.
246. Brief for the United States, supra note 112, at 19.
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Corley, these types of situations do not fit into the statutory frame-
work of subsection (c) and must be suppressed under the holding in
Corley.247  This narrow construction, therefore, is damaging to judicial
integrity because it serves no beneficial function at “great societal
cost.”248
Moreover, the court in United States v. Halbert249 was also con-
cerned with the technical problems that could arise under a narrow
interpretation of subsection (c).  Citing legislative history, the court
noted that “crime will not be effectively abated so long as criminals
who have voluntarily confessed their crimes are released on mere
technicalities.”250  The court also noted that Title II “would restore the
test for admissibility of confession in criminal cases to that time-
tested and well-founded standard of voluntariness. It would avoid the
inflexible rule of excluding such statements solely on technical grounds
such as delay.”251 Halbert recognizes that, particularly to the victim,
justice is not served when the court cannot punish his assailant due to
police delaying presentation before a magistrate, and especially where
there is no hint of coercion in eliciting the assailant’s confession.  Con-
gress recognized this politically abhorrent situation and as a result
eliminated the inflexible McNabb-Mallory rule because it was not pro-
moting the justice that society and victims deserved.
The problems of the Court’s decision in Corley can be seen in the
preceding cases that suppressed confessions obtained more than six
hours after arrest.  In Perez, for example, the defendants were in-
dicted for conspiracy to distribute, and possession with intent to dis-
tribute, heroin.252  Because they confessed after the six hour mark,
their confessions were suppressed.253  The obviously guilty parties
were freed because of this technicality.254  In United States v. Robin-
son255 a defendant convicted of second-degree murder had his convic-
tion overturned on appeal, in part because he made incriminating
statements more than six hours after his arrest.  Also, if United States
v. Manuel256 had been decided today, the confession of a second-de-
gree murderer would have to be suppressed because it occurred eigh-
teen hours after the arrest.
What the Court has done is to provide a legal loop hole through
which defendants, who are guilty and who have voluntarily confessed,
247. Id. at 20.
248. Id. at 17.
249. 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970).
250. Id. at 1236 n.6.
251. Id. at 1236 (emphasis added).
252. United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1984).
253. Id. at 1036.
254. Id. at 1035.
255. 439 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
256. 706 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1983).
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readily jump to avoid conviction on the basis of a mere technicality.  If
the defendant has the patience to wait six hours and one minute, they
can confess to the crime, and it cannot be used against them.  Though
a conviction can still be had based on other evidence, societal interests
in truth and justice should not be made to suffer.  Defendants should
not be allowed to have their voluntary confessions suppressed because
of a technicality in the amount of time it takes busy police officers to
present them for arraignment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501 to respond to what it saw as a
growing problem—too many obviously guilty defendants being acquit-
ted.  Congress viewed a main source of the problem to be rooted in the
confession rules adopted by the Court in the McNabb-Mallory line of
cases.  The legislative intent clearly demonstrates that Congress
meant to abrogate the McNabb-Mallory rule and restore a voluntari-
ness test.  Admittedly, Congress created confusion when it enacted
subsection (c) of section 3501.  Though the Supreme Court has now
held in Corley that Congress only intended to limit the McNabb-Mal-
lory rule, this decision fails to follow the intent of Congress and has
the potential of creating a greater burden than the McNabb-Mallory
rule itself imposed.
By failing to carry out the full legislative purpose behind section
3501, the Court has put itself in a position to overrule acts of Congress
that are within the powers of Congress to enact.  In doing so, the
Court has also stripped trial judges of their judicial integrity and dis-
cretion. Now obviously guilty defendants have a real chance at being
acquitted on the basis of a technicality or harmless error.  Judges can
no longer view the totality of the circumstances to promote the inter-
ests of societal justice and public demands for more effective law en-
forcement.  Safer streets and more effective law enforcement were
Congress’ purposes in adopting section 3501.  However, the Court has
disregarded these purposes, potentially setting back crime control ef-
forts to the years prior to Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.  Therefore, while the Court should re-ex-
amine this decision and adopt the dissent’s view, a better solution is
for Congress to amend 18 U.S.C. § 3501 to clearly restore the volunta-
riness test that was originally intended and overrule Corley v. United
States.
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